NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL CENTENNIAL CONFERENCE
in honor of JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN

MORNING SESSION

Welcome
Dean James F. Simon
New York Law School

Panel 1: Justice Harlan as a Judicial Conservative

Moderator:
Chief Judge James L. Oakes
U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Presenters:
Professor Bruce A. Ackerman
Yale Law School

Professor Charles Fried
Harvard University Law School

Commentators:
Professor Kent Greenwald
Columbia University School of Law

Professor Gerald Gunther
Stanford Law School

AFTERTNOON SESSION

Panel 2: Justice Harlan and the Bill of Rights

Moderator:
Judge Roger J. Miner
U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Presenters:
Professor Norman Dorsen
New York University School of Law

Professor William W. Van Alstyne
Duke University School of Law

Commentators:
Dean Jesse H. Choper
University of California at Berkeley School of Law

Professor Nadine Strossen
New York Law School

Panel 3: Justice Harlan’s Legal Process:
Justiciability, Civil Procedure, & Remedies

Moderator:
Charles Lister
Covington & Burling

Presenters:
Professor Martha A. Field
Harvard University Law School

Professor Charles R. Nesson
Harvard University Law School

Commentators:
David L. Shapiro
Deputy Solicitor General
U.S. Department of Justice

Professor Donald H. Zeigler
New York Law School

LUNCHEON

Luncheon Speaker:
Professor Tinsley E. Yarbrough
East Carolina University
Author of a forthcoming biography of Justice Harlan to be published by Oxford University Press

A reception will immediately follow the close of the conference at 5 p.m.
THE SCHOOL

This year New York Law School celebrates the 100th anniversary of its founding. The School looks back on a proud history that began with its establishment as an independent institution by the dean, several faculty members, and many students of Columbia University's School of Law. As a distinctly urban law center, New York Law School has remained in lower Manhattan throughout its history and has maintained a vital relationship with the legal, government, corporate, and financial institutions of New York City. It currently enrolls more than 1,300 students, with approximately equal numbers of men and women, in day and evening divisions.

In January 1990, New York Law School opened its new Mendik Library at 240 Church Street, a state-of-the-art facility of 50,000 square feet in a newly renovated building. This year it has created a Lawyering Skills Center, which has as its centerpiece the Samuel J. and Ethel Lefrak Moot Court Room. The Center houses the new Lawyering Skills Program, which encompasses all practical legal education efforts at the School and makes them an integral part of the academic program.

THE CONFERENCE

The academic highlight of New York Law School's centennial celebration is a one-day conference honoring its most distinguished alumnus, Justice John Marshall Harlan of the class of 1924. A conference planning committee consisting of Dean James F. Simon of New York Law School; Eve Harlan Dillingham, granddaughter of the late Justice; Professor Norman Dorson of New York University School of Law; Professor Charles Fried of Harvard Law School; Charles Lister of Covington & Burling; Judges Edward J. Lumbard and Roger J. Miner and Chief Judge James L. Oakes, all of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has brought together a unique group of leading legal scholars and members of the federal judiciary to discuss three aspects of Justice Harlan's career on the federal bench: Justice Harlan as a Judicial Conservative, Justice Harlan and the Bill of Rights and Justice Harlan's Legal Process: Justiciability, Civil Procedure, and Remedies.

Six distinguished presenters will prepare papers on these topics. Presentations will be followed by a discussion of 8 to 10 minutes each by two commentators. The papers and commentaries will be published in a special issue of the New York Law School Law Review.

JUSTICE HARLAN

John Marshall Harlan, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1954 to 1971, ranks high among the most influential members of the modern Supreme Court. The grandson and namesake of the U.S. Supreme Court Justice who served from 1877 to 1911, Justice Harlan was born in Chicago where his father was mayor. He attended Princeton and was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford before returning to the United States to attend New York Law School.

After his graduation in 1924, Justice Harlan earned a formidable reputation as a trial lawyer with the New York firm now known as Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, where the hallmarks of his success were thorough preparation and impeccable organization. Excluding stints as Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and counsel to the New York State Crime Commission and military service during World War II, Justice Harlan remained with the firm until his appointment to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1954. Nine months later, he was elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

To label Justice Harlan a "conservative" or "liberal" even in the judicial sense would be unnecessarily limiting. He believed that the Court's authority was strictly limited and that it was not the role of the judiciary to correct every wrong in the federal system. "The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements," Justice Harlan wrote. Yet, if that opinion tends to place him in the conservative mold, it should also be remembered that Justice Harlan wrote the opinion that established for the first time freedom of private association as a fully guaranteed constitutional right, and that, in the early 1960's, it was he who first saw the sit-in demonstration as a legitimate form of free expression.

The inability to easily classify Justice Harlan may be due to his studious attention to the factual detail of each and every case before him. Paul Freund, Loeb University Professor Emeritus at Harvard, once wrote that Justice Harlan's "basic responsibility, as he conceives it is to decide the cases before him, with that respect for its particulars, its special features, that marks alike the honest artist and the just judge."
CENTENNIAL CONFERENCE
IN HONOR OF
JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN

FOREWORD
James F. Simon

JUSTICE HARLAN AS A
JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVE
James L. Oakes
Bruce Ackerman
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JUSTICE HARLAN
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
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JUSTICE HARLAN'S
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Tinsley E. Yarbrough

BOOK REVIEW
Jethro K. Lieberman

NOTE
Lori G. Wentworth

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JUSTICE HARLAN AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
A DICHTOMY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS*

ROGER J. MINER**

In the jurisprudence of Justice Harlan, a citizen of the United States generally may rely on an expansive reading of the enumerated rights set out in the Bill of Rights for protection from the depredations of the federal government. The citizen of a state, however, generally may rely only on a rather subjective reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restraint on arbitrary state action. The jurisprudence of Justice Harlan does not accommodate the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states. What is not permitted to the national government, therefore, may be allowed to a state government. Acts of the national government may violate the rights or liberties of citizens of the United States, while the same acts, performed by a state government, may violate no rights or liberties of the citizens of the state. The dichotomy is contradictory, confusing, and, ultimately, irreconcilable.

When the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a federal obscenity statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials, using an approved definition of obscenity, Harlan dissented. In his opinion, the federal statute could not be constitutionally construed to reach more than hard-core pornography. His dissent encompassed the notions that the interests protected by the obscenity statutes are primarily those of the states, that the federal interest in this area is attenuated, and that the dangers of federal censorship are greater than the dangers of state action of the same type. Concurring in a decision upholding a state obscenity statute, however, Harlan considered the relevant inquiry to be whether the state so subverted the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process

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** Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School.


3. See id. at 507.

4. See id. at 504-06.
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to require invalidation of the state action. 5

When the Supreme Court held that a city’s prohibition on the exhibition of a motion picture deemed not suitable for young viewers was unwarranted under the provisions of a statute providing for the classification of motion pictures, Justice Harlan dissented. 6 He wrote:

[N]o improvement in this chaotic state of affairs is likely to come until it is recognized that this whole problem is primarily one of state concern, and that the Constitution tolerates much wider authority and discretion in the States to control the dissemination of obscene materials than it does in the Federal Government. 7

When it came to applying the brakes to the states, it seems that Justice Harlan would have us rely on his vision of good and evil. In the celebrated California case involving the conviction of a man who wore in a courthouse a jacket emblazoned with the initial letters of each word in the phrase “for unlawful carnal knowledge” juxtaposed with the words “the draft,” Harlan gave us his vision of the limits on state regulation of speech. 8 He concluded that the state could not bar the obscenity under the provisions of a statute prohibiting disturbance of the peace by affirmative conduct. 9 Finding plainly untenable the state’s argument that it could regulate the speech in question because it spawned the inherent likelihood of violence, Harlan explained that the existence of those “with such lawless and violent proclivities” is not a sufficient basis for allowing the state to bar people from “ventilat[ing] their dissident views.” 10 He simply thought that the word in question could not be distinguished from any other offensive word, expressing himself in the oft-quoted phrase, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” 11 Robert Bork has objected to the moral relativism of the phrase, pointing out that “one man’s larceny is another’s just distribution of goods.” 12 The comparison may not be an apt one, but it does point out the lack of a standard.

5. See id. at 501. The state case, Alberts v. California, was decided in the same opinion as Roth.
7. Id. at 107-08.
9. See id. at 19-20.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id. at 25.
Justice Harlan has been described as an aristocrat, one "of noble lineage," as well as "a patrician of the spirit." 13 I am not sure what is meant by those terms. I do know that much of Harlan's civil rights jurisprudence evinces a paternalistic approach to the problems of society. When the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute first came before the Supreme Court and was dismissed for lack of a live controversy, Harlan dissented. 14 He confronted the merits of the claim and held the statute unconstitutional on due process grounds. In his opinion, the state statute violated substantive due process, which he characterized as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." 15 When the Court finally confronted the merits of the state statute and held that criminalizing the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional on the basis of "zones of privacy," "emanations," and "penumbras," 16 Harlan issued a separate concurring opinion. 17 Again looking directly to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan found that the Connecticut statute "violate[d] basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 18 These are wonderful words, but difficult to characterize as law.

Harlan nevertheless supported the power of the states to deprive their citizens of a number of rights we now take for granted. He thought that there was a rational basis for a state poll tax as a voting qualification, observing that "the Equal Protection Clause . . . [does not] rigidly impose upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism." 19 He considered state legislative apportionments wholly free of constitutional limitations, except for the guaranty to each state of a republican form of government, a guaranty generally not applicable to apportionment. 20 He thought that the Miranda decision "represent[ed] poor constitutional law

15. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
17. See id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
and entail[ed] harmful consequences for the country at large."\textsuperscript{21} He thought wrong the Court’s holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states under federal standards, finding that the holding “carries extremely mischievous, if not dangerous, consequences for our federal system in the realm of criminal law enforcement.”\textsuperscript{22} He further found the Court’s incorporation doctrine antithetical to the “purpose of our federal system” through a “compelled uniformity.”\textsuperscript{23}

When the Supreme Court, applying federal standards, granted the habeas petition of a person who had been convicted of contempt after invoking his self-incrimination privilege in a state gambling investigation, Harlan protested what he perceived as the Court’s premise “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a shorthand directive to this Court to pick and choose among the provisions of the first eight Amendments and apply those chosen, freighted with their entire accompanying body of federal doctrine, to law enforcement in the States.”\textsuperscript{24} In his view, the criminal justice systems of the states should be checked only by an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause that is informed by the “development of the community’s sense of justice [which] may in time lead to expansion of the protection which due process affords.”\textsuperscript{25} That is just about as standardless as you can get!

Carrying out the same theme, Harlan, in a double jeopardy case, attacked the selective incorporation doctrine as unsupported “in history or reason” and decried the “eroding . . . of the basics of our federal system.”\textsuperscript{26} In a case dealing with a New York rule allowing the jury to determine both the truthfulness and voluntariness of a confession, he wrote that “‘the states are free to allocate functions as between judge and jury as they see fit,’” and “[l]imitations on the States’ exercise of their responsibility to prevent criminal conduct should be imposed only where it is demonstrable that their own adjustment of the competing interests infringes rights fundamental to decent society.”\textsuperscript{27} In a case involving a state’s harmless error rule, his question was whether the rule was a reasonable one and whether it was “applied arbitrarily to evade the

\textsuperscript{22} Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{23} Id. at 16.
\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 15.
\textsuperscript{25} Id.
\textsuperscript{26} Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 808-09 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{27} Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 439 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 179 (1953)).
underlying constitutional mandate of fundamental fairness.”

Harlan’s expansive view of the Bill of Rights as applied to the federal government is manifested in a number of his decisions. He criticized the lack of a warrant in a case involving the search of an illegal distillery. He required that an informant’s information be shown to be reliable as a basis for a finding of probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant. In another case, dissenting from the majority’s view, he said that removing an automobile from the scene of an arrest and holding it for a search at the convenience of the police oversteps the applicable exception for warrantless searches of automobiles. He favored giving appellants the retroactive benefit of favorable new rules on direct appeal. These cases stand in sharp contrast to Harlan’s view of the Bill of Rights as applied (or really as not applied) to the states. The problem of the Harlan dichotomy, as I see it, lies in its failure to account for another Fourteenth Amendment provision that is just as important as the due process requirement: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”

Justice Harlan was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1955, the year that I was elected Managing Editor of the New York Law School Law Review, then known as the New York Law Forum. Our March 1955 issue was dedicated to Justice Harlan. We reviewed his educational background, his career at the bar, his public service, his World War II service, and some of the decisions he wrote during his year as a Second

29. Id. at 47.
34. See generally William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and Civil Liberties, 20 S.C. L. REV. 389 (1968) (examining Harlan’s due process jurisprudence); Lewis I. Maddocks, The Two Justices Harlan on Civil Rights and Liberties: A Study in Judicial Contrasts, 68 KY. L.J. 301 (1979-80) (contrasting Harlan’s views with those of his more activist grandfather in regard to constitutional restriction on state action).
Circuit judge. We noted President Eisenhower's statement that Harlan's qualifications for the Supreme Court were the highest that he could find, although we knew that Thomas E. Dewey and Herbert Brownell had passed on their favor with the President to a man who was their friend, colleague, and partner.38 We observed in the conclusion of the dedication that Harlan's "lifetime of active practice is one asset in which the present Court is not particularly strong, since many of the Justices came to the Court from political or academic life."39 In retrospect, I cannot help but wonder if it was that background—United States Attorney, downtown New York City law firm, cloistered youth, Princeton and Oxford—that contributed to the dichotomy of his jurisprudence. Perhaps we should not have been so critical of academics and politicians.

37. See id. at 10.